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As science was trying to attack the epidemic, society too began to challenge its effects, largely without the help of the government. By 1918, the government was involved in virtually all aspects of American life, especially as wartime led to food and fuel rations and, of course, the military draft. Provost Marshal Enoch Crowder was in charge of the draft and issued a “work or fight” order in May 1918, meaning all men between the ages of 18 and 45 had to either join the military or have a full-time job. And even as the war was winding down in September 1918, with Austria and Germany trying to engage the allies in peace negotiations, Wilson would not relent. Nor would he offer any leadership about the virus. He made no public statement about the pandemic and offered no help from the federal government. And even after Gorgas warned all camps and bases that influenza was spreading, the army pressed on, ignoring his warnings. Crowder did eventually cancel the draft in September 1918, likely saving thousands of lives, but his efforts and Gorgas’s would be the only positive interventions at the federal level.
On September 19, 1918, Gorgas’s deputy wrote army brass to request they quarantine troops before sending them to Europe. Army commanders refused the request, and the troop transport vessels became death ships, as infected American soldiers were crammed aboard on the way to France. Once in France, most of the new troops could not fight, as the majority of them were ill. Training in the camps had also ceased, so during the height of the pandemic, the only military activity that continued was the shipping of troops overseas.
Wilson’s impact on civilians was even worse than his impact on soldiers. He said and did nothing about influenza publicly, and America’s chief public health official, Surgeon General Rupert Blue, was ineffective. In fact, beyond doing nothing, Blue actually blocked research efforts while making no effort to prepare the Public Health Service for the pandemic. After weeks of the pandemic spreading, on September 22, Blue finally sent out an insert for newspapers to publish. The “Surgeon General’s Advice to Avoid Influenza” told Americans to avoid crowds, cover their coughs, and wash their hands, and offered other similar bromides (311). With governors and mayors begging for help, Blue eventually went to Congress for funding to hire more doctors and nurses. The trouble was that there were few doctors and nurses to hire. The Red Cross had picked up some of the slack by mobilizing what they called “Home Defense Nurses,” fully trained nurses who could not serve in the military because of their age or marital status (313). But it was too little too late, and October became the worst month of the pandemic.
The only actions that could have slowed or stopped influenza from spreading were extreme interventions and quarantines. Such efforts were taken as recently as 1916 to stop the spread of polio, but Blue was unwilling to try anything approaching the effort that would be needed, even as scientists and physicians recognized that the virus was hitting in waves and that America was beginning to see the onslaught of the second wave. However, given the way the virus peaked and crested, it was possible to attack the existing peaks and then move doctors and nurses to the emerging peaks. The Public Health Service moved to find doctors and asked the Red Cross to find nurses.
While there was no treatment for the viral infection, doctors could treat the virus’s secondary effects, such as bacterial pneumonia and other infections. Doctors could also drain pusses from infected patients and treat ailments that spread to the heart, but this required resources and time they did not have. Making matters worse, the pool of eligible doctors was quite small—around 100,000 total—and most of them were deemed incompetent (which was why they weren’t already being used by the army or navy). The ones who were good enrolled in a new “Volunteer Medical Service” and were sent from city to city with some success (318). Nurses proved even harder to find, and they were actually more important for patient care than doctors, given that diagnoses weren’t largely needed during the pandemic. But there were fewer nurses than physicians available. The Red Cross had been enlisted to recruit nurses to Europe and had done this so successfully that most American hospitals already had a shortage of nurses by the time of the outbreak at Devens.
In Philadelphia there was no sign of either Red Cross or Public Health Service help. The virus spread unimpeded. Lewis, in his lab, continued to look for Pfeiffer’s bacillus, as his main weakness as a scientist was that he trusted those he respected too much, and he trusted Pfeiffer. He was finding the bacillus in most autopsies, at least. With no guidance from the mayor or Krusen, and no treatment in sight, the rich families of Philadelphia began to assert themselves.
Philadelphia had several great rich families with lots of power, influence, and money. Principal among them were the Biddles, Drexels, Whartons, Martins, and Peppers, all of whom had created extensive distribution and recruitment networks to sell war bonds. The heads of these families acted without the city government to summon the heads of private organizations to the Emergency Aid office on October 7. There, they created a plan to use those same networks to distribute aid and food.
Krusen ceded control of the nurses to the group and put his own people in charge of cleaning the streets of filth and sewage. He then sent police to clear bodies out of people’s homes. The police often piled the bodies into wagons that brought to mind the plagues of medieval Europe.
Still, the pandemic continued, with at least one ill patient in nearly every home. To avoid the pandemic, people isolated themselves, spreading still more fear. The papers reported that there were nurses, but there were not enough, and with isolation and illnesses in each home, many families could not feed themselves let alone take care of the sick. The professionals who helped were heroic, but Philadelphia was unable to recruit many volunteers to help. Nearly 5,000 people died in one day during the peak of the outbreak, but no one knew it was the peak. After all, “Krusen had too often said the peak had passed,” and the “press had too often spoken of triumph over disease” for anyone to believe the official line anymore (332). Beyond deaths, the city was seeing other problems, as factories and railroads became understaffed, orphanages overcrowded, and citizens underfed.
Philadelphia was like every city on the planet, from those in New Zealand to those in Switzerland. The virus was spreading, and newspapers reported a mix of half-truths and overly sunny reports even while physicians seriously considered the disease to be the plague and not merely influenza. Indeed, the press made everything worse, as it began to publish messages against fear itself. Papers from Albuquerque to Des Moines to Little Rock to Bronxville to Phoenix all either published no news of the influenza outbreak or published reports saying influenza was on the decline or that the best advice to fight influenza was not to get scared (337).
But it was impossible to avoid being afraid of the virus. While most officials reminded the public the virus was merely influenza, the Public Health Service finally addressed the virus by distributing posters and pamphlets with the surgeon general’s advice on them. But the advice to avoid crowds and wash one’s hands came too late, as the virus was already everywhere. The Journal of the American Medical Association dismissed the statements from the papers and attacked the Public Health Service’s advice as pointless. And as the papers warned people not to be afraid, fear took over the public at large, as they no longer believed anything the papers said. Some even accused the German army of being responsible for the virus. The Public Health Service wasted time investigating the possibility that the virus was the result of germ warfare.
In Philadelphia and other cities, officials tried to figure out how to maintain order while caring for the sick, while citizens’ committees, like the one in Philadelphia, sprung up to help. Schools and churches were closed in cities across the country, and buildings were converted to emergency hospitals. Mountain and desert towns were less impacted, because many chose to close off their towns as the pandemic spread. The newspapers in Phoenix bucked the national trend and warned citizens of the truth of the pandemic. The citizens’ committee there encouraged citizens to wear masks, asked businesses to provide more space for customers, and asked the police to arrest anyone seen spitting or coughing without covering their mouths. As a result, Phoenix was barely affected by the pandemic. Still, panic came. People even began killing dogs after a rumor that dogs carried influenza.
The war ended in November, but the pandemic persisted. The war was fought in Europe, far from most Americans’ realities beyond the sacrifices all had been asked to make. But the pandemic and the fear it caused were everywhere. One Philadelphia citizen complained about the tolling church bells that rang every time a person carried a casket into church, seemingly every few minutes. She became terrified, wondering, “Is the bell going to bong for me?” (350).
There were not enough responses for physicians, nurses, and volunteers, but those who did respond tried valiantly to treat the patients they had. They tried everything, including treatments that lacked any scientific grounding, as there was no time for any kind of proper scientific method for most physicians. Some tried hydrogen peroxide, some tried the typhoid vaccine, some tried homeopathic cures. Nothing worked. Throughout the world hundreds of millions of people likely saw no physician at any point during the pandemic, leading many to try folk remedies or over-the-counter medications.
By mid-October 1918, different vaccines began to pop up, including one by Park and Williams as well as one by Lewis. The army began to distribute a vaccine created at Walter Reed Hospital, but the general civilian population was largely on its own. It didn’t matter, though, as none of the vaccines worked all that well. Nothing could cure influenza, and the only places that survived unscathed were those that practiced isolation. Some of the places most hard hit, though, were areas that had not isolated but had also not been exposed to much civilization beforehand. Indigenous communities in parts of Alaska, for instance, saw nearly half of the population die of either influenza or its effects. In remote Canadian villages on the Atlantic Coast, large percentages of the population died, as did large numbers in the jungles of South America and Guam. India was the worst-hit nation, with nearly 10% of its population lost to influenza.
As Vaughan wrote, if the epidemic went on at the rate it was going, “civilization could easily disappear from the face of the earth within a matter of a few more weeks” (365).
The bulk of Part 8 deals with the ways non-scientists responded to the influenza pandemic and establishes that there were some truly heroic efforts. With governments not responding appropriately, average citizens began to take control, demonstrating some of the best of humanity. However, these efforts were only needed because of the complete failure of leadership from Wilson, Blue, and others. Barry argues implicitly that lives were lost because of the lack of leadership at the top as well as the singular focus on winning a war that was pretty much already over. It seems unconscionable or at least extremely unnecessary that Wilson continued to send soldiers to Europe even while Austria and Germany were attempting to surrender, and even while the pandemic prevented soldiers from actually being trained or fighting. Throughout the book Barry has been thorough about showing how much warning everyone had of the pandemic’s effects, making clear Wilson and others had no real excuse, even with all the unknowns surrounding the pandemic (and the mistakes Welch, Gorgas, and others did make, which Barry admits). By the fall of 1918, it was clear to everyone that packing young men onto ships was likely to spread the virus. And Wilson’s lack of any statement to civilians about the pandemic makes one question if he cared at all about the soldiers, American citizens, or the pandemic at large.
The Great Influenza uses a great deal of foreshadowing, and in this section some of the earlier events hinted at are finally revealed. Readers learn, for instance, why Barry focused so much attention on the reformation of medical schools. With that information, it makes sense why so few good doctors were available, as the doctors trained by medical schools prior to Flexner’s suggested changes would largely lack actual medical knowledge. Throughout the book Barry also warned about the waves of the virus and the fact that things were only going to get worse. In this section all that comes to fruition. Finally, Barry also reveals why he spent so much time complaining about the censorship of the virus from the news: it caused an erosion of public trust that only exacerbated the pandemic in places like Philadelphia.
Indeed, much of Part 8 is about the press. In Chapter 29, for instance, Barry makes extensive use of newspapers from the era to provide evidence that papers from Des Moines to Little Rock to Bronxville, New York, were ignoring the disease or misreporting it, spreading rumors or fear instead of facts. A paper in Bronxville even noted that “[f]ear kills more than the disease and the weak and timid often succumb first” (336). Telling the public to toughen up and not be afraid of the virus obviously did not do the public good, and even helped exacerbate the situation. Plus, how could the public feel safe when surrounded by so much death? The visual and aural image of the constantly tolling church bell powerfully brings the fear to life.
Barry argues that it is necessary for the public to receive scientifically sound information to prevent any virus from spreading. By illustrating how so many newspapers ignored this imperative, Barry once again helps the reader understand the mood of most people during the pandemic and how the virus spread so rapidly. He also explains that the fear of harming the war effort was ingrained in the press that no journalist would dare go against the official line. When the press become agents of propaganda, the public suffers both a loss of trust and a loss of safety. It is impossible to know how much such a lack of trust contributed to the pandemic, but the combined efforts of the government and the press clearly did not help.
To hammer home that point, Part 8 also makes extensive use of grim statistics from around the world. This section expands the text’s focus to include remote villages and diverse areas of the globe beyond the United States and Europe. This affirms that the pandemic truly was worldwide but also that it was unequal in its impact. Some places did better than others either because of the work of citizens, truth-tellers in government and the press, or just plain luck. Vaughan’s warning at the end of Chapter 30, though, clarifies that most places did not do well. And the quotation could come across as hyperbolic without the litany of grim statistics Barry shares in this section.
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