Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking

Traditionally, truth has been defined in philosophy as the agreement of the mind with reality. Pragmatists have no objection to this definition, but disagreement comes in when we try to define exactly what is meant by “agreement” and “reality.” The most common explanation of agreement is that it occurs when the mind copies reality. However, James criticizes this definition because it implies that truth is “inert and static” (77). Pragmaticism is interested in the impact something being true will make in our lives. He states a major principle: “True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify”; and, conversely, “[f]alse ideas are those that we cannot” (77). For James, this means that truth is essentially a process: Things become true as we test and verify them by a process of being led from one idea to another. As we are led successively to new inferences and conclusions, we test them against the original idea, and if it harmonizes with the new ideas then we judge them to be true.

Elaborating on this pragmatic theory of truth, James starts with the premise that “the possession of true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instruments of action” (78). In other words, truth has definite practical consequences. For example, a person lost in the woods can find their way out by means of a cow path leading to a house.

We store many beliefs, waiting for the time when we will be called upon to use them. Our knowledge is both true and useful, which amounts to the same thing. The fact that we can keep truths stored up latently in our minds suggests that “truth lives for the most part on a credit system” (80). We believe some things not because we have personally verified them, but because someone else has, and we trust their testimony. However, like banknotes, these latent beliefs must be backed up and verified by someone, somewhere: “[i]ndirectly or only potentially verifying processes may thus be true as well as full verification processes” (80).

James now returns to the ambiguity cited at the start of the lecture. What precisely is meant by “reality”? He proposes a three-part definition. Realities mean either concrete facts, abstract kinds of things and relations perceived intuitively between them, or the whole body of other truths already in our possession.

Now James addresses the second part of the ambiguity: What does it mean to “agree” with such reality? The relationship he posits is more fluid and less absolute than what is implied in the concept of “copying” reality. James argues that to agree with reality “can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed” (82). In other words, to know truth, pragmatically speaking, means to be in a workable relationship with things; it means to be in a position in which our ideas allow us to deal with reality and adapt our lives to it without.

As James puts it, “Agreement thus turns out to be essentially an affair of leading—leading that is useful because it is into quarters that contain objects that are important” (83). That is, truth leads us into useful interactions with the things of our world, rather than misleading us about them. In true pragmatic fashion, this definition emphasizes that truth is of practical importance for us, and not merely a cause for abstract contemplation. This concept of truth, in fact, has practical and social consequences: Seekers of truth will be led to “consistency, stability and flowing human intercourse” and away from “excentricity and isolation, from foiled and barren thinking” (83).

Truth is just like health, wealth, and strength, in that it is a process that happens “in the midst of things” (84) rather than a pre-existing quality inhering in things. Truth works—is a process of action—just as the pursuit of health or wealth is: “The true, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is only the expedient in the way of our behaving” (86). It is thus necessary to think and believe what is true precisely because truth works and falsehood does not work. Practicality becomes the test of truth.

We thus have a duty to agree with reality. However, this duty is founded in our “concrete experiences” and not on any “abstract” or “transcendent” concept of truth (90). Pragmatism, in fact, emphasizes the existence of truths (plural) instead of a “Truth with a big T” (89). In doing so, it distinguishes among various truths according to their relevance to the situation at hand. Thus, pragmatism recognizes that truth is conditioned by our needs and circumstances.

Toward the end of lecture, James responds to attacks on pragmatism by rationalists: “Surely in this field of truth it is the pragmatists and not the rationalists who are the more genuine defenders of the universe’s rationality” (91). This is because pragmatism, unlike rationalism, poses a reason or motive for pursuing truth and relates truth to our personal lives.

Lecture 6 constitutes the heart of Pragmatism as it is about the core principle of pragmatism: defining truth and the consequences that follow from this definition. Uncharacteristically James’s genial tone grows more strongly polemical and argumentative, showing his determination to defend pragmatism against its opponents. He exhibits sarcasm and even exasperation toward his rationalist critics, as when he accuses their philosophy of exhibiting “inanity” (88) and characterizes their criticisms as “an impudent slander” (90).