Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community

Children flourish in states with a high Social Capital Index, where “residents trust other people, join organizations, volunteer, vote and socialize with friends” (296). While socioeconomic and demographic characteristics impact child welfare, social capital does as well. In fact, it is second in impact on children only to poverty and has an almost perfect correlation with children’s positive development. Child abuse rates are higher in areas with low social capital and low neighborhood cohesion.

States with high levels of social capital have better educational outcomes than those with low levels. Social capital is the “single most important explanatory factor” (300) on state dropout rates and test scores. Informal social capital or schmoozing is a stronger predictor of student achievement than formal social capital. Informal interaction and trust allow for strong communities, which in turn produce higher levels of parental support for teachers and less student misbehavior. Children in such communities are also likely to watch less television and benefit more from leisure time. The national decline in the PTA is reflective of declining parental involvement, which is bad for student outcomes. Public schools seeking to improve student outcomes are opting to adopt smaller, more communal schools to encourage parental engagement.

The presence of social capital most distinguishes safe and organized cities from unsafe and disorganized ones. Multiple studies have found that higher levels of social capital result in lower crime and murder rates. A lack of social capital might explain why murder rates in the South were roughly twice those in the North in the 1980s and 1990s (309): Low levels of social capital correlate with interpersonal conflict. Putnam asserts that an individual’s behavior depends partly on the behavior of those around them. When individuals are connected via trusting networks and common values, young people are more likely to have access to mentors, role models, and educational sponsors. Mutual trust, altruism, and a willingness to intervene when children are misbehaving are a big part of the explanation as to why some neighborhoods are less plagued by crime.

The decline in neighborhood social capital is a key component of the inner-city crisis, but families can impact neighborhoods by raising “well-adjusted and well-behaved kids” (314). However, when problems are widespread, the positive impact of family social capital is limited. Putnam identifies gangs as a misguided and destructive attempt to fill the void in areas where social capital has declined. In short, social capital is positive most of the time for disadvantaged neighborhoods, and there is evidence that its presence can break the link between economic disadvantage and teenage crime. Recent shooting sprees in the suburbs demonstrate that increasing social capital is important in more affluent areas as well.

For an individual, social capital is a powerful resource affecting “occupational advancement, social status, and economic rewards” (321). The number of distant acquaintances is more valuable in this regard than close friends, as the former increases the likelihood of unexpected opportunities. In immigrant communities, for example, social capital benefits individuals who are offered positions and are able to obtain loans in some cases. Among young men, 85% used personal networks to find employment, and approximately 50% of people report finding a job through a friend or relative.

Putnam argues that social capital is not only good for individuals economically, but also for neighborhoods and countries. For example, with high levels of social capital and therefore less crime, housing values are likely to be higher. In some instances, cooperation fuels economic growth more so than competition. He cites the examples of technology companies in California’s Silicon Valley and the Route 128 corridor in Massachusetts. The former had horizontal networks and higher levels of social capital, while the latter operated with less social capital under hierarchical, secretive, and competitive conditions. Without social trust, money must be spent on surveillance equipment, insurance, and law enforcement. On the other hand, Silicon Valley performed better economically, and early indications are that social capital boosts economic efficiency.

There is a well-established relationship between health and well-being and social capital. “The more integrated we are with our community, the less likely we are to experience colds, heart attacks, strokes, cancer, depression, and premature deaths of all sorts” (326). The health benefits of social connectedness are similar to those of quitting smoking. Multiple studies have found a strong correlation between connectedness and health at the community level. Possible reasons for this relationship are that social networks aid people in the form of care, transportation, and other services. They also reinforce healthy norms, with isolated people more likely to drink, overeat, and smoke. Connected communities are better able to organize politically to obtain good medical services. Social connectedness might even trigger a physiological mechanism which stimulates people’s immune systems to fight disease (327). In the last 25 years, there have been declines in both social participation and self-reported health despite advances in medical treatments.

The breadth and depth of social connections also best predict happiness. Social support protects people from the stresses of daily life. Not surprisingly, with the decline of social capital, both depression and suicide are increasing. Social participation is “the happiness equivalent of getting a college degree or more than doubling your income” (333). Life satisfaction has declined since the 1960s, with Putnam attributing about half of the decrease to less social connectedness. What is more, the happiness deficit is greatest among young and middle-aged people, with those over 55 happier than people their age were in the 1960s. Putnam highlights the psychological price that the US is paying for the decline in social capital.

Social capital and membership in voluntary associations enhance democracy in two ways, namely, via external effects on the larger polity and internal effects on the participants. Voluntary associations allow individuals to combine their voices and achieve more influence. They are vehicles to obtain political information and to express interests and claims. Additionally, they have the potential to serve as forums for thoughtful deliberation. The participants acquire practical skills and habits of cooperation and public spiritedness. The experience of participation is likely to cultivate civic virtues of active participation, trustworthiness, and reciprocity, with the latter here referring to “the willingness of opposing sides in a democratic debate to agree on the ground rules for seeking mutual accommodation after sufficient discussion, even [...] when they don’t agree on what is to be done” (340).

There are critics of voluntary associations, particularly the prevalence of interest groups. Putnam acknowledges that some groups are anti-democratic in their goals. Similarly, the benefits of political organization often accrue to the advantaged, and that in turn, can trigger political polarization and cynicism. On balance, however, voluntary associations are beneficial. Without them and social capital, politics is likely to be more shrill and less balanced with extremists driving the agenda. Indeed, as American moderates have reduced their involvement in voluntary associations by half from the 1970s to 1990s, more extreme views have become dominant. What is more, national membership organizations have failed to provide the social benefits associated with local groups. This decline in American civic engagement is in sharp contrast to the past, when sociological observers, such as de Tocqueville in the early 19th century, lauded local civic involvement and considered it a “handmaiden” (337) to national democracy.

Social capital impacts political outcomes as well. Civic engagement “matters on both the demand and supply side of government” (346). Citizens expect and demand better government when engaged, and the performance of government is assisted when there is a “social infrastructure of civic communities” (346) and prevalent democratic values. In the US, political scientist Daniel Elazar classified three types of civic traditions: traditional, individualistic, and moralistic. The traditional culture, dominant in the South, has low levels of social capital while the moralistic one, dominant in the Northeast, Upper Midwest, and Pacific Northwest, has high levels of social capital. The individualist culture is between the two. The moralistic regions have less corrupt governments and more innovative public policies. Social capital increases the legitimacy of government.

Another word Putnam uses for social connectedness is fraternity. Critics of social capital maintain that fraternity comes at the cost of tolerance and equality. They cite the lack of privacy in small communities and the increase in tolerant attitudes from the 1970s to 1990s to support their case. Bonding social capital, note the critics, causes exclusion, particularly along racial, class, and gender lines. Putnam rebuts these claims.

In Putnam’s view, individuals who are engaged with their community are more tolerant and supportive of civil liberties than those who are not. Additionally, people from high social capital states are more likely to be committed to racial and gender equity as well as more supportive of civil liberties. He acknowledges that bonding social capital is more likely to have illiberal effects than bridging social capital but emphasizes that the greatest threat to liberty comes from the disengaged (358). Strong communities and financial equality are reinforcing as there were record highs in income equality and social capital in the 1950s and 1960s. In the last third of the 20th century, both income equality and social capital have declined. The evidence thus refutes the simplistic assumption that fraternity comes at the cost of liberty and equality. A positive correlation, however, does not prove causation. Social capital might help produce equality, but it is also possible that there must be a reasonable amount of financial equality for social capital to thrive. Alternatively, both social capital and financial equality might be “fostered by the same external forces” (359).

Putnam admits that fraternity might at times be in conflict with itself. In other words, some kinds of bonding capital could potentially discourage the formation of bridging capital, which is necessary to resolve the country’s biggest collective problems. Bonding capital creates strong ties with intimate friends, which “may ensure chicken soup when you’re sick, but weak ties with distant acquaintances are more likely to produce leads for a new job” (363). Most of the evidence points toward bridging and bonding capital being complementary, but there are times when they can conflict.