102 Minutes

Chapter 1 begins at 8:46 a.m. at the moment of impact in the North Tower, at 1 World Trade Center, and documents initial impressions of those inside, most of whom, like Dianne DeFontes, thought a bomb exploded. The authors write: “By tipping its wings just before impact, Flight 11 cut a swath through seven floors, severely damaging all three escape staircases” (6). They add that “jet fuel ignited and roared across the sky, as if the fuel continued to fly […] the impact registered on instruments at Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in Palisades, New York, twenty-two miles to the north, generating signals for twelve seconds. The earth shook” (8).

American Airlines Flight 11 smashes into the offices of Marsh & McLennan, which occupied space on the 93rd to 100th floors: “The impact killed scores of people who could never have known what hit them” (8). Electrician Mike McQuaid was certain the feeling he felt while installing fire alarms was an exploding transformer. Louis Massari’s wife Patricia’s voice went silent from her office at Marsh & McLennan on the 98th floor—after telling Louis her pregnancy test showed positive results—because she slipped, ripping the phone from the jack. In the lobby, Dave Kravette “heard a tremendous crash and what sounded like elevator cars free-falling” (2). Unable to reach the police, a man at the Risk Waters conference at Windows on the World calls his wife and asks her to call police, to inform them a bomb exploded. “It’s a bomb, let’s get of here” (4), said Gerry Gaeta, a member of a team that oversaw trade center construction projects. Gaeta believes he knew how the bomb entered the building, as moments earlier he saw a cart loaded with documents and believed it hid a bomb. Gaeta thinks “the boxes of “documents” are“a Trojan horse” (4). From the 106th floor, Howard Kane, controller for Windows on the World, is on the phone with his wife, and suddenly hears a woman scream, “Oh, my God, we’re trapped” (2). The De Martinishave just finished coffeewhen they “watched a river of fire spill past the window” (4).

Meanwhile, in the building’s police bureau, Alan Reiss “heard talk of a missile” (6) fired from the roof of the Woolworth Building. Moments later, from World Trade Center 5, Reiss and another person see the north tower: “Instead of the waffle griddle of the building’s face, they now saw a wall of fire spread across ten or fifteen floors” (6). From a window on the 61st floor in the north tower, Ezra Aviles, a Port Authority employee, sees everything. Aviles dials five numbers, “telling everyone up the chain of command to begin the evacuation” (5). To those in the know, the explosion cannot be a bomb, as the center’s 1993 basement bombing caused little damage: “Compared with the powerful load absorbed by the face of the towers from winds that blew every hour of every day, the truck bomb in the basement was puny […] If the monumentalism of the towers made them a natural target, their very height added protection” (3). 

Chapter 2 captures the confusion, lack of evacuation plans, and dedication to the capitalist work routine many workers experience at 2 World Trade Center, the south tower, around 8:47 a.m., moments after Flight 11 crashes into the north tower. Similarly to Chapter 1, Dwyer and Flynn weave in information about the 1993 bombing and highlight safety improvements, such as employees who double as fire wardens on each floor. The authors touch on the lack of guidelines despite new requirements,which were implemented after a 1970 fire at the center, which was erected in 1968. The fire department implemented these changes to account for safety deficiencies. In the 1980s, real estate brokers profited from building skyscrapers, upon being freed from long-standing safety guidelines. The authors note how the Port Authority boasts about helping to organize these improvements not required by code. Most important here is the lack of information and organization, mixed with indecision and dedication to earning money.

Many in the south tower call loved ones to report their safety and explain, still not knowing a plane crashed into the north tower, the trouble was in the other tower. At financial company KBW, on the 91st floor, all of the traders are at or near their chairs, after managers yell about it being a work day, to begin work at 9 a.m. KBW employee Stephen Mulderry sees a man remove his burning shirt and jump from the north tower.

At Mizhuzo Capital Markets, and its affiliate, Fuji Bank, which had offices on every floor between 78 and 93, the policy is different. After a 1996 bomb at its London office, the bank issued a memo that said “the bank’s assets […] were its people—more valuable than any reports that were being written, more important than tickets for trades that were outstanding […] they were to drop their work and go” (16). Likewise, Michael Sheehan, a broker at Garban ICAP, immediately runs from his desk, barely noticing that he knocks over a fellow employee.

As lack of information hampers evacuation decisions, many in the south tower keep on with work as usual. Others head for the stairs, while some return to their desks to retrieve a leather bag or new pair of shoes. On the 98th floor, a hot blast slaps Marissa Panigrosso in her face as she works at her desk. Around her people scream, as disorganized efforts inform workers to evacuate. 

It’s 8:48 a.m., two minutes post-impact in the north tower, and those inside the tower, many of whom felt the building shake and can see debris and smoke floating outside the windows, attempt to evacuate. The 170 people at Windows on the World suffer from smoke seeping up from below, as the fire-proofing between floors fails. GM Christine Olender telephones the Port Authority police command desk for instructions, but there are none. Steve Maggett tells Olender to call back in two minutes. Meanwhile, Garth Feeney, there to attend the Risk Waters conference, telephones his mother. “Mom, I’m not calling to chat” (24) Feeney says, informing her he is on the top floor.

To those in the north tower, the terrible situation reveals itself. Ed Beyea, paralyzed from the neck-down, watches a stream of people rush past as he waits in the 27th floor stairwell for helpwith a coworker. Beyea tells the aide who assists him to get out of the building. On the 91st floor, Mike McQuaid and his five-electrician crew search for stragglers though most workers have already begun to try to exit; however, “[t]wo of the stairwells had been reduced to smithereens” (23). Gerry Wertz, from March & McLennan, leaps off the elevator onto the 91st floor at the last second, thinking someone has placed a hand grenade on the elevator, which crumbles as he leaps: “No one from the higher floors was coming down: the stairs to the 92nd floor were blocked tight” (24).

The authors state that “[d]uring the first ten minutes after the crash, the 911 system would log some 3,000 calls, many of them from people on the upper floors of the north tower” (26). The chapter closes from the perspective of Port Authority public-relations officer Greg Trevor, who tells NBC that no, he cannot give the network five minutes, he must save his own life.